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A price reveal auction is a Dutch auction in which the current price
of the item on sale remains hidden. Bidders can privately observe the
price only by paying a fee, and every time a bidder does so, the price falls
by a predetermined amount. We show that in equilibrium, no rational
bidder should enter into such an auction. Contrary to this prediction,
data about actual price reveal auctions run on the Internet show that
bidders do enter and that the mechanism is pro￿table for the seller.
JEL Classi￿cation: D44, C72.
Keywords: price reveal auctions, pay-per-bid auctions.
1 Introduction
This paper provides the ￿rst analysis of a new and peculiar online selling
mechanism, the so-called price reveal auctions. A price reveal auction is a
Dutch auction (i.e., descending price) in which the current price of the item
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drea.gallice@carloalberto.org.
1on sale is not publicly observable. Each bidder can privately observe this price
by paying a fee c. The bidder is then given a limited amount of time (say,
30 seconds) to decide if he wants to buy the good at the current price. If the
bidder buys the good, the auction ends. Otherwise, the price is decreased by
a ￿xed amount ￿ < c and the auction keeps going.1 In other words, in a price
reveal auction the price is hidden and falls by ￿ every time a bidder observes
it. Therefore, and contrary to standard Dutch auction procedures, the price
does not fall exogenously at a predetermined speed but rather endogenously
in response to bidders￿behavior.
A price reveal auction is an example of the more general category of pay-
per-bid auctions. These mechanisms enrich traditional auction formats with
some more ￿exotic￿elements and have recently gained some traction on the
Internet. The reason is that items are usually sold for extremely low prices
(often less than 5% of the market value). Nevertheless, these auction formats
turn out to be pro￿table for the seller, as the revenues that he collects through
the bidding fees more than compensate for the low selling price.
Lowest unique bid auctions (LUBAs) and penny auctions are certainly
the most prominent examples of pay-per-bid auctions. In a LUBA bidders
place secret bids, and the winner is the one who submits the lowest unique
o⁄er, i.e., the lowest o⁄er that is not matched by any other bid. Theoretical
and/or empirical analysis of LUBAs appear in Eichberger and Vinogradov
(2008), Gallice (2009), ￿stling et al. (2009), Rapoport et al. (2009) and
Houba et al. (2010). In a penny auction each bid increases the current price
by a ￿xed amount (a penny) and restarts a public countdown; the winner is
the bidder who holds the winning bid at the moment the countdown expires.
1Notice that the decision to observe the price remains private so that no bidder can infer
the current price from the number of times the price has been observed.
2Various aspects of penny auctions are analyzed in Augenblick (2009), Byers et
al. (2010), Hinnosaar (2010) and Platt et al. (2010).
The attention that pay-per-bid auctions have raised should not come as a
surprise, as there are many interesting aspects that characterize these mech-
anisms. First, these are games in which bidders face complex strategic situa-
tions whose equilibria are non trivial. Second, it is relatively easy to retrieve
￿eld and/or experimental data about bidders￿ actual behavior; this allows
researchers to test theoretical predictions and identify other empirical regular-
ities. Finally, the optimal design of these mechanisms is still unclear.2
In this paper we investigate these issues in the context of price reveal auc-
tions. We show that this auction format has a very clear cut prediction. In
fact, according to the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game, no bidder
should submit any bid; rational bidders realize that no player has any incen-
tive to submit the ￿rst few bids given that the private costs of observing the
price outweigh the bene￿ts. As such, the price does not fall, the item remains
unsold and the auctioneer makes zero pro￿ts. Contrary to this prediction (and
thus contrary to the hypothesis of rational behavior of the bidders), data about
actual price reveal auctions show that entry occurs and that the mechanism
is moderately pro￿table. We discuss the introduction of two rules that could
further stimulate entry and increase the pro￿tability of this auction format.
2 The model
We model the sale of a single indivisible item through a price reveal auction.
Let N = f1;:::;ng be a set of risk-neutral potential buyers. The auctioneer (a
2This is an important issue, as pay-per-bid mechanisms seem particularly suitable for
charitable purposes.
3non-strategic player) sets the starting price at p0 = vr where vr is the retail
price of the good. The starting price remains always visible while the current
price pt is not publicly observable. At any period t 2 f1;:::;Tg each bidder
i 2 N plays ai;t 2 f￿;obs ￿ fnb;bgg. Action ai;t = ￿ indicates that player i
remains inactive. Action ai;t = (obs;nb) indicates that agent i observes the
current price pt but decides not to buy the good. Action ai;t = (obs;b) indicates
that agent i observes the price pt and decides to buy the good. A bidder is
charged the fee c > 0 whenever he observes pt, i.e., whenever ai;t 6= ￿. Every
time that a bidder plays ai;t 6= ￿, the price decreases to pt+1 = pt ￿ ￿ with
￿ 2 (0;c).3 Otherwise, pt+1 = pt. The auction ends at te 2 f1;:::;Tg where
te = T if ai;t 6= (obs;b) for any i and any t while te = ^ t as soon as a bidder
plays ai;^ t = (obs;b).
Bidders have a valuation vi for the good on sale. We assume that each vi
is independently and identically distributed on the interval [0;vr] according to
the cumulative distribution function F which is strictly increasing and con-
tinuously di⁄erentiable with density f. In line with the standard independent
private value assumption, each bidder knows vi and knows that every vj6=i is
drawn from F. Finally, let ￿i;t 2 N0 be the number of times bidder i observes
the price (and thus pays the fee c) up to period t included. Payo⁄s, therefore,





vi ￿ pte ￿ c￿i;te if i buys the good
￿c￿i;te otherwise
for i 2 N
A price reveal auction is thus an extensive game with imperfect information,
as bidders do not know pt and do not observe rivals￿valuations and actions.
3If ￿ > c then a bidder could drive pt down to zero by playing vr
￿ times action ai;t =
(obs;nb). This strategy would cost c
￿vr < vr and would thus ensure positive pro￿ts as far
as c
￿vr < vi where vi is bidder i￿ s valuation.
4As a solution concept, we apply the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Before properly de￿ning such an equilibrium (Proposition 1), we ￿rst discuss
some of its characteristics and introduce some additional notations.
First, notice that bidders accumulate sunk costs c every time they observe
the price. Therefore, a player would ideally observe pt only once, discover a
price that he likes and buy the item. More precisely, the bidder should observe
the price when he believes pt has reached what he thinks to be its optimal level
b￿(vi). Let ￿i;t(￿) indicate the beliefs bidder i holds at time t. A bidder should
then play ai;t = (obs;b) when ￿i;t(pt = b￿(vi)) ￿ ~ ￿i where ~ ￿i is some threshold
to be de￿ned later. On the contrary, if ￿i;t(pt = b￿(vi)) < ~ ￿i then the agent
should play ai;t = ￿.
As for b￿(vi), this value optimally solves the trade-o⁄ between the surplus
that the agent may realize and the risk of being preempted by the rivals. To
explicitly de￿ne b￿(vi), we analyze the bidding behavior that would emerge
in a standard Dutch auction characterized by the same parameters vr, n, F,
and c. In a Dutch auction pt falls exogenously and is always visible so that a
player does not have to form beliefs about the current price; thus, his optimal
strategy is to buy the product when pt = b￿(vi). Exploiting a fundamental
result of auction theory (see Klemperer, 1999 and Krishna, 2002), we know
that such a Dutch auction is strategically equivalent to a ￿rst price sealed bid
auction with entry fee c.
The latter situation has been carefully investigated by Menezes and Mon-
teiro (2000), who show that in the symmetric Bayesian equilibrium, bidders
enter the auction only if their valuation is above a cuto⁄ value ￿. This value
is implicitly de￿ned by the condition ￿F(￿)n￿1 ￿c = 0 which imposes indi⁄er-
ence in terms of the entry of a player for which vi = ￿. Menezes and Monteiro









Integrating the above expression by parts, we can reformulate the optimal
bidding strategy as:4
b









which clearly shows that b￿(vi) < vi for any vi > ￿ and any n ￿ 2. We can
now properly de￿ne the equilibrium of a price reveal auction:













(obs;b) if ￿i(pt ￿ b￿(vi)) ￿ ~ ￿i
￿ otherwise
where b￿(vi) is as in (2), ~ ￿i = c
vi￿b￿(vi) and every bidder holds beliefs ￿i;t(pt ￿
b￿(vi)) = 0 at any t. Therefore, on the equilibrium path, all bidders play (￿)
T
t=1.
Proof. First notice that, at any t, action ai;t = (obs;nb) is strictly dominated
for any possible beliefs player i holds about pt. More precisely, ai;t = (obs;nb)
is dominated by ai;t = (obs;b) whenever ￿i;t(pt ￿ b￿(vi)) ￿ ~ ￿i and by ai;t = ￿
whenever ￿i;t(pt ￿ b￿(vi)) < ~ ￿i. Therefore only actions ai;t = (obs;b) and
ai;t = ￿ can be part of the equilibrium. To solve for the beliefs threshold ~ ￿i,
consider the condition:
~ ￿i(vi ￿ b
￿(vi) ￿ c) ￿ (1 ￿ ~ ￿i)c = 0
4Let g(x) = x and h(x) = F(x)n￿1. Then b￿(vi) = 1
h(vi)
R vi
￿ g(x)h0(x)dx. Integration by
parts leads to b￿(vi) = 1
h(vi)
￿





6which imposes indi⁄erence between the expected payo⁄s associated with action
ai;t = (obs;b) and action ai;t = (￿). Solving for ~ ￿i, one gets ~ ￿i = c
vi￿b￿(vi) which
de￿nes the equilibrium. Now, given that b￿(vi) < vi ￿ vr for every i and that
￿ < c, on the equilibrium path all bidders play ai;1 = ￿. Therefore, it is
common knowledge that p2 = vr. This implies ￿i;2(p2 ￿ b￿(vi)) = 0 < ~ ￿i for
every i so that ai;2 = ￿ and p3 = vr. The same reasoning iterates as sequential
rationality implies pt = vr and ￿i;t(pt ￿ b￿(vi)) = 0 < ~ ￿i for any i and any t.
It follows that, on the equilibrium path, all bidders play (￿)
T
t=1.
Proposition 1 states that in equilibrium, no bidder ever observes pt. There-
fore, the good remains unsold, ui;te = 0 for every i with te = T and the auction
raises zero pro￿ts for the seller.5 Notice that this result holds for any distrib-
ution F as well as for any n. As such, it also holds in cases in which players
do not know the number of opponents and/or individual valuations are highly
dispersed.
Example 1 Consider a price reveal auction with vr = 100, c = 0:8, ￿ = 0:4,
and i 2 f1;2;3g. Let F be uniform on [0;100] with v1 = 10, v2 = 50, and
v3 = 95. Then, ￿ =
3 p
8000 = 20. As such agent 1 does not enter the auction
while b￿(v2) = 26:4 and b￿(v3) = 59:42. But given that the condition pt ￿ b￿(v2)
(resp. pt ￿ b￿(v3)) requires pt to be observed 184 (resp. 102) times and that












t=1. Therefore, none of the three players submits any bid.
Thus, the current design of price reveal auctions is ￿ awed as the mechanism
does not trigger the initial entry of the bidders. Clearly, not much would change
5Payo⁄s for the seller s with valuation vs 2 [0;vr] are given by us;te = pte ￿ vs +
c
P
i2N ￿i;te if a bidder buys the good and by us;te = c
P
i2N ￿i;te otherwise.
7if the auctioneer set the initial price p0 at a level ~ v < vr.6 In what follows, we
will brie￿ y discuss two alternative rules that could stimulate entry and thus
improve the pro￿tability of the mechanism.
The ￿rst suggestion is to make the starting price p0 random. More precisely,
the rule should specify that the seller sets p0 according to some distribution
G de￿ned on [kvr;vr] with k 2 (0;1). Bidders are not informed about p0 but
they know vr, k, and G. The second suggestion is to modify the law of motion
of pt so as to make it partly exogenous. In particular, the rule should state
that pt falls by ￿ not only every time a bidder observes the price but also
every s periods where s is distributed on fsmin;:::;smaxg according to some
distribution H. In this case, bidders do not know s but they know smin, smax,
and H. Both rules would make the game appealing also for rational players,
as the event pt < b￿(vi) would now have positive probability to occur.
3 Some data
In this section we present some summary statistics about actual price reveal
auctions that have been organized by the website bidster.com.7 This website
￿rst introduced price reveal auctions on the 29th of December 2009. On average
a new price reveal auction is o⁄ered every 2-3 days and auctions do not expire
(i.e., T = 1). Therefore an auction closes only when a bidder buys the
product. At the moment of writing, 70 auctions have closed and, in every
6In fact, if there exists at least a bidder i for which vi > ~ v+c, then this agent immediately
buys the good and the auction ends at t = 1. On the contrary, if vi ￿ ~ v +c for every i, the
situation is analogous to the one described in Proposition 1 so us;te = 0.
7Bidster.com is the European market leader for pay-per-bid auctions. Other websites
o⁄ering price reveal auctions include dealwonders.com, bidmoo.com, bidenvelope.com, and
many others.
8auction, the relationship ￿ = 1
2c holds.8
Variables average min max st. dev. sum
Retail price vr 540:04 59 1;700 406:39 37;803
Selling price pte 365:62 6 1240:25 294:10 25;593
Discount (1 ￿ pte=vr) 0:36 0:07 0:97 0:17
Bidding fee c 1:25 0:5 2 0:76
Price decrease ￿ 0:625 0:25 1 0:38
# of times pt has been observed 444:36 4 3;595 528:99 31;105
Estimated pro￿ts9 174:42 4 983 161:82 12;209
Estimated pro￿ts (% wrt vr) 35:8 6:8 97 17:3
Table 1. Some summary statistics of the data. All monetary values are in e.
By eyeballing Table 1, it is immediately evident that the data are hardly
consistent with what the equilibrium analysis suggests. Proposition 1 indicates
in fact that in equilibrium, no bidder ever observes the price. This implies that
a price reveal auction should raise zero pro￿ts. The data show instead that, on
average, the current price pt has been observed 444:36 times in every auction.
This entails average pro￿ts that amount to 35:8% of the retail price vr. Pro￿ts
are thus much lower than those that LUBAs or penny auctions raise but still
signi￿cant.10
Notice that equilibrium analysis also indicates that the number of times
bidders observe the price pt remains at zero no matter the value of the item vr
8The dataset is available upon request. Typical items include popular game consoles,
mobile phones, and digital cameras.
9Estimated pro￿ts are computed according to the formula pte ￿ vs + c
P
i2N ￿i;te and






10Gallice (2009) reports an estimated 441% for LUBAs while Byers et al. (2010) ￿nd a
value of 86% in the case of penny auctions.
9and the bidding fee c. In other words, #  is independent of vr;  and c where
we use the subscript   2 f1;:::;70g to index the individual auction. We test
these relationships by estimating the equation #  = ￿ + ￿1vr;  + ￿2c  + ￿ 









which indicates that both coe¢ cients ￿1 and ￿2 are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero at the 5% level.
While these results could be easily rationalized by assuming the existence
of some boundedly rational agents, they are clearly inconsistent with the as-
sumption of perfect rationality of all the bidders.
4 Conclusions
The success that pay-per-bid mechanisms are experiencing on the Internet
raises a number of interesting questions and it also provides a clear opportunity
to observe people￿ s behavior in the ￿eld. In this paper we have analyzed the
most recent example of these mechanisms, the so-called price reveal auctions.
We proved that if agents were fully rational, a price reveal auction should
attract zero bids and thus lead to zero pro￿ts for the seller. Contrary to this
prediction, data about actual price reveal auctions show that players submit
enough bids to make the mechanism pro￿table. We interpret this inconsistency
as evidence of bidders￿limited rationality, and we claim that this ￿na￿vetØ￿is
the only possible source of pro￿ts for the sellers.
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